I wrote before about the lessons Obama learned and forgot concerning public image ("Why Obama Won, And Why He Is Losing Support Now"), but this time I want to look at Obama's rather clever solution to succeeding in electoral politics, and the evidence that he, and his party, completely forgot that lesson, as show by their recent losses.

The truth of electoral politics is this: the majority does not decide elections. Election turnout is rarely even 50%. No, in most elections maybe 30-40% show up. Of those, 80-90% are committed to one side or the other out of the gate. Which means 10-20% of 30-40%, or maybe 3-8% of the electorate decide most elections. And that means, at the absolute best, most politicians, even the most ardently admired, under normal circumstances, are winning with 8% or less of the people, though in the polls they are ahead by up to 20%.

This is the lesson Obama learned, and one that had been ignored by recent politicians. Because, if you can win by persuading 3-8% of the people, then you can also win by dragging another 3 -8% of the people to the polls to offset your rival's lead. Not that Obama needed it against McCain, as McCain ran a rather lackluster campaign, but it definitely helped against Clinton, and would have helped had the Republicans fielded a better candidate. Rather than try only to appeal to the undecideds, Obama also brought out voters, college students, minorities and others, who do not normally vote. By adding to the pool, suddenly he had a built in majority.

It is a clever strategy if you can pull it off, but, unfortunately for Obama, it is a lesson he learned only part way. He appears to have forgotten the flip side.

The flip side is "If you upset enough people, those who don't normally vote might come out to the polls and defeat you." In the year of tea parties, bitter debate over health care reform, corporate takeovers by the government and 10% unemployment, with a  president whose interests seem to stop at getting the Olympics for Chicago and winning the perpetual campaign, is it any wonder that the Demcorats fared poorly in these off-year elections? After all, a small part of Obama's 2008 victory, and a big part of the Democrat victories in 2006, was the turn out of voters dissatisfied with Republican control of the government, and Bush in particular (or the image of Bush the media painted, whichever you prefer). And yet, somehow, this lesson was lost on Obama.

Had Obama been truly concerned with getting his party members elected, as well as improving Democrat chance in 2010, he would have behaved quite differently. First, he would have granted that the stimulus was not yet having the desired effect and declared he is looking for alternate solutions, even made some gestures in that direction. He would have listened when the tea parties sprang up and made a pledge (even if it was broken the day after the 2010 elections) to not raise taxes. And he would have put his more controversial plans on the back burner, or found a Democrat from a safe seat to act as the front man for his policies, so he could safely distance himself and the rest of the party from them.

But I think such behavior is impossible for our president. First, he seems to have a problem even hearing criticism. He seems to notice it, but he just gives a smile, a glib word, and thinks that solves any problem. Second, he seems unwilling to change, at least on certain issues. He appears so convinced of his position that he is unable to even believe that others might not agree, or if they do it must be from some sort of malicious motive. These traits are not compatible with doing what is necessary to support his party.

Of course I may be wrong. My impression of Obama comes from his public statements and may be a media persona unrelated to his real identity. But if that is the case, then it is a bad choice. To select a media persona which is inflexible and arrogant seems a choice calculated to turn off many voters and to do harm to your party, and even your own chances, in any future elections.

POSTSCRIPT

Before someone argues that Obama's inflexibility on issues in which he believes is consistent with my own beliefs, I would suggest reading "Cigarettes, Sudan and Abortion". What Obama is inflexible about is the method, not the goals.He wants not "medical care for all", but "insurance for all". He is, as I described in my essay, inflexible about the means, not the end. If I proved to him conclusively that moving to a free market solution would provide medical care for everyone, does anyone think he would? Or would he blindly push for "universal insurance"? That is what I mean by being inflexible in methods but not in principles.

POSTSCRIPT II

In some ways this also explains Bush's victory in 2004. The press was right in ascribing some state victories to "values voters", but they missed the significance. The "values voters" the press bemoaned were basically additional voters, brought to the polls by local initiatives which upset people enough to bring to the polls those who did not normally vote. Of course they were offset to some degree by Angry Left partisans seeking redress for the "stolen election" of 2000. The only reason it wasn't a wash was that the Angry Left partisans were largely drawn  from those who do normally vote, so the anger over 2000 did not bring many new voters to the table, while the "values voters" included a large number of individuals who did not normally vote.

POSTSCRIPT III

Note that some official numbers do not tell the whole story. For example, Obama probably brought more voters out that is generally accepted. The difference in turnout between 2004 and 2008 is not the total additional turnout. As local issues brought out values voters in 2004, without Obama's new voters, this election's turnout may have been lower still. Not to mention that lack of enthusiasm over McCain may have meant a lower Republican turnout as well. So, in looking at elections, it is difficult to go by just the raw numbers. (Also note that, in some ways, any analysis of polls and turnout numbers is going to be impressionistic. We are dealing with determining human motivation and, like all social sciences, some degree of understanding is involved. Polls alone do not tell the entire story. There will always be some degree of personal "story telling" involved. And I admit as much. My explanation cannot be entirely demonstrated by the numbers alone, nor by the polls. Then again, no explanation can. That is a problem inherent in attempting to explain motivation.)