I think I provided the best definition of catastrophic thinking in the opening paragraph of my essay "All Life in a Day, or, How Our Mistaken View of History Distorts Our Understanding of Events":

How many times have you heard something described as the biggest/best/worst/greatest/first ever, or of all time, or some other claim ending in a superlative? Now, part of this is the love our journalists, historians, and other raconteurs for prodigies. It is easy to justify a tale if the subject can end in "-est", as far back as the ancient Greeks the recording of prodigies and anomalies was seen as the role of the historian. But, that sort of explanation, while it helps explain some of this love of superlatives, is not the whole story. Yes, people do love the unique, the ground breaking, the first, the novel, the aberrant, but even so, they need to believe the noteworthy event real is worthy of note. So, why is it so easy to convince the vast majority that a given even really is the first, the best, the worst, the biggest, or otherwise unprecedented in the annals of human history? Why is every upcoming flu the deadliest? Every political event the greatest success or worst catastrophe? Every political opponent the death knell of freedom? Why is global warming going to destroy us? Why, in short, are things which seem much like the rest of history so often described in terms so melodramatic?

Though not intended as a formal definition, it paints quite a clear portrait of the thought process I have chosen to describe as "catastrophic thinking." In that essay, as well as my earlier essays "Historic Myopia" and "The Runaway Stagecoach", I painted a picture of an attitude toward history, either in general, or --in the earlier essays especially -- in a limited context, which sees the present as the "turning point", the culmination of some grand process, following which we will either suffer disaster or usher in utopia, or perhaps a bit of both, but in any case, a point at which things will change to such a degree that we will no longer need to face the old concerns, as what follows will be sufficiently different that we will need to thinking about matters in entirely different terms.

The phenomenon is hardly new, I need only point to some early Christian sects which expected the immediate inauguration of Christ's rule on earth to show that it has existed for at least two thousand years, and certainly they were not the first. Nor is it limited to a particular political orientation, the doomsday fears of environmentalists have their equal in the fears of those expecting Obama to establish his own personal army to circumvent the constitution. Nor is it limited to gloomy, or simply apocalyptic, predictions. Granted, many expect the world to end, our civilization to be destroyed, or something similar, but some simply anticipated armed revolution to sweep away all they find detestable with the current state (again, with proponents on both sides of the aisle), or merely the collapse of our current economic order. The one unifying thread is not that the world will end, but that things will change, and change enough that they will be unrecognizable, the old rules will no longer apply, and, for all intents and purposes, history as we understand it will come to an end,  either because the new state will represent a fundamental change in the state of things (for better or worse), or because it will be the end of some lengthy process which has unified our understanding of history (eg. the Marxist view of communism as the "final stage of historical evolution", or the belief of various faiths in the establishment of "heaven on earth" in one form or another).

There are any number of reasons individuals adopt specific apocalyptic beliefs, but underlying the entire phenomenon are a few very basic causes.

What might seem the most obvious basic belief is actually not necessary, and that is a belief in some over-arching principle guiding history. While that does apply to a number of these beliefs, we can see in the doomsday beliefs of the environmentalists, or the predictions of doom that accompanied Obama's election, that those without any clear conception of a pattern to history can still have apocalyptic visions of history¹, though, to be fair, the "end of history" they imagine is usual of a less absolute sort than that imagined by those with a belief in history having a "story". (Though the environmentalists' doomsday scenarios are pretty final, at least as far as human history is concerned.)

So, what is necessary for one to adopt this catastrophic mindset? Again, the answer comes (in part) from my earlier essay "All Life in a Day, or, How Our Mistaken View of History Distorts Our Understanding of Events":

There was an old cliche that claimed there existed a Chinese curse which translated as "May you live in interesting times." I have a feeling this is as bogus as the claim that Einstein said the lines about insanity, or Kurt Vonnegut wrote about sunblock (both untrue), but whether true or not, it isn't a bad aphorism, after all most periods of history which we find of interest (with the possible exceptions of the early Industrial Revolution and the "Gilded Age") are noteworthy precisely because of the wars, plagues, disasters and other turmoil, or, at best for those living through them, because of the tremendous social upheavals and resulting unrest. In other words, interesting times really are miserable for those who live through them.

However, I doubt anyone could peddle a similar aphorism today. I have often written about our social mindset being similar to that of a teenager, but in this case that description fits better than ever. If you recall your teen years, the one thing you probably remember is the overwhelming desire to "be something", an all-consuming desire to find oneself known, to live through times that were, if nothing else, interesting. It is quite clearly part of the same mindset which drives our cultural obsession with fame, this desire to endure anything if only one can be spared more of the same. Teenagers, and our perpetual teens claiming to be adults, would happily suffer through quite a bit of misery if only it will mean they won't be "bored", that their times will be eventful and their name well known

What I failed to mention in that earlier work is how utterly common that juvenile perspective has become, even among those nominally mature adults, or, equally important, how the emphasis on novelty as a value in itself (mentioned in a footnote to the earlier essay), has spread throughout our society to the point where it is almost universally accepted. Those topics I developed in my essays "Juvenile Intellectuals", "O Tempora! O Mores!, or, The High Cost of Supposed Freedom" and, most recently, "Something of a Paradox", but, for the sake of those who do not normally follow links or read cited essays, allow me to offer a brief explanation. drawn from my essay "Cranky Old Man?":

My first objection, and the most important, is precisely what I mentioned above, the fact that the adoption of the values of youth by adults leads inexorably to a culture which rejects all values. As I said, the pattern is created in which youth reject the values of their parents, parents then adopt, to some degree, the values embraced by youth. seeing their parents adopting their values, youth feel the need to rebel again, and so push farther, and the adults respond by embracing some part of the new rebellion. This continues within a single generation, and in generation after generation, until such a time as it becomes impossible to rebel as the permissive standards simply allow no more rejection.

Actually, there is one value which both the young and old seem to agree on embracing, and that is novelty. We see it in our fascination with change for the sake of change, as well as the inordinate value we place on something being "new", being the latest, the most recent, the first and so on. Because tradition is denigrated by those embracing youth as a value, the same people must also embrace novelty as having worth in itself. In fact, novelty is the one value against which the young never rebel. While rejecting everything else about their parents, they agree with them in embracing novelty as a measure of worth.

But that is itself a destruction of values. As I said in another essay, if we judged paintings only on how blue they were, eventually you would end up without any paintings, just blue canvasses. Similarly, when we value nothing but novelty, then we have no way of judging the value of anything, and must move from idea to idea, action to action, based solely on how recent it is. It ends up effectively depriving us of the ability to judge any values.

Of course, in practice no one consistently holds to novelty as the measure of all values, nor do they consistently reject all of their parents' values. But as I wrote elsewhere, when a principle is held by all, those who implement it most consistently tend to control the course of events. So though many might not consistently hold to the destruction of all values, those who press farthest, who destroy the most values, those who act with the most license, they will win. And so, though some may act with more practicality, they are the inconsistent ones, and those who are most extreme in holding to these beliefs will have the most impact on events.

In short, though it may not be the desire of most, the logic of this belief results in the embrace of absolute license, whether we want it or not.

I could probably say more to explain the obsession our culture has with novelty, but that is not my point here. It is enough to understand that we are novelty-obsessed and that fascination functions as the basis for a catastrophic view of history². In the present essay, unlike those earlier works, I am not concerned so much with examining the reasons behind the beliefs, or the foundations upon which those beliefs ultimately rest, but instead want to examine how those beliefs play out in the political, economic and social realms. So, for our present purposes, we have more than enough background material, and those interested in more detailed analysis can find it in the essays cited above.

I think the first, and most pronounced, effect, is one that has been often used as a tool by cynical politicians. That is the reality that people who believe they are in a critical situation tend to make bad decisions. Politicians have long recognized this truth, as have salesmen of insurance and other similarly marketed products³. The moment someone believes disaster looms around the corner, he is happy to jump at the first offer of salvation, usually without taking adequate time to consider whether there is a better alternative, or even whether the offer is really as it is portrayed. Why else do so many politicians talk down the economy, predict unlikely foreign aggression, portray foreign trade as some sort of warfare about to destroy our industries⁴, or otherwise try their best to convince voters the end is nigh? Because they know that a crisis mindset is one that is both motivated and disinclined to rational evaluation. A frightened voter is a voter willing to give his support to the first life line thrown to him.

However, that is but an overview of the way we react to the belief we are living through a crisis. It is a good start, but there are many specific details we need to examine, as the description above hardly paints the whole picture. Nor does it even do an adequate job of portraying the normal, high level experience of crisis thinking. After all, not every crisis is immediately exploited by savvy politicians, many times politicians come to believe in the crisis as much as the voters, and find themselves as incapable of rational thought as their constituents. So, while we can paint a general picture of how crisis thinking can be exploited by those who choose to do so, what else does it do? What happens when people are convinced of a crisis, but no one steps forward to drive that fear into specific channels? And beyond those political actions aimed at offering up nominal solutions, what else does life during a perpetual crisis do to the people? How are they shaped by the belief they are facing impending doom? Or even impending salvation?

One of the most distinctive traits of those convinced they are facing "The End", in capital letters, is the attitude best described as "apres nous le deluge", an abandonment of all concerns for propriety and morality, base don the belief that, since we won't be around long enough to suffer consequences, why should we worry about them. We can hear this in those many self-serving "punk rock"⁵ movies of the 90's, which often began with a disaffected narrator giving a profanity laden harangue, blaming his parents and their generation for "poisoning" the planet, wrecking the economy and otherwise messing everything up (they usually use a stronger term), and offer that as a justification for his upcoming nihilistic rampage. Yes, it is a self-serving attitude, and it is not even novel, many late 60's radicals blamed the series of assassinations of prominent left wing icons for their own excesses, and before that offered up anti-parental rants similar to those of the 90's. But, self-serving or not, there is a reason they pick this particular excuse, and that is because there is an element of truth. They may have been inclined to nihilism anyway, they may always have lacked any sort of restraint or discipline, but they are also children who were raised in an environment which told them the end could come at any time, be it nuclear, environmental or economic, and so they internalized that idea, and, to one degree or another, came to abandon the concept of seeking to improve either themselves or the world around them⁶.  To one degree or another, catastrophic thinking helps to destroy the concept of morality, or at least standards of behavior⁷.

A similar mentality, though of a more reserved and mature variety, can be seen in political and economic planning. When we come to imagine that the long term is not quite as long as we once thought, it tends to color our cost-benefit analysis. Of course, with the future being uncertain, and becoming less certain as it becomes more remote, all cost-benefit analysis weights the immediate future more heavily than the remote future, but traditionally, we do still pay some small amount of attention to the long term, adjusting for the potential for very distant profits and costs. When we imagine that crisis is imminent, it colors that analysis. In most cases, it inspires us to simply stop thinking about the future beyond a certain point, judging anything past the immediate future to be too uncertain to consider. In other cases, we adopt a watered down version of that thought, and decide the future needs to be considered, but treated as wildly uncertain, making the adjustments for future possibilities count for much less than they normally would. In either case, the result is a drawing in of our time horizons, a limiting of our perspective, and a skewing of economic and political analysis to favor the short term over the long⁸.

There is another expression of this "apres nous" mindset which normally gets little attention, perhaps because it is so easily overlooked, and that is apathy. If one expects the end to come, for better or worse, it is often easier to do nothing, rather than continue to strive when you expect it to come to nothing. Granted, many who anticipate disaster or revolution allow that belief to drive them to excesses of activism, and others allow the impending disaster to justify their bad behavior, but many, faced with the same supposed facts, choose to do nothing. Nor is it as uncommon as one would expect, even among formal political doctrines. Many forget it today, but at one time it was the official policy of communists to refuse to support the union movement, as unions would delay the "full flowering of capitalism" and thus delay the coming of communism. Similarly, those expecting an impending revolution, or those expecting the world to end, often find it the most reasonable course of action to simply do nothing⁹.

Which brings me to the most obvious expression of the crisis-driven mindset, the very opposite of this apathy, the need to act, regardless of cost or consequences. Obviously, those feeling apathetic do so because they believe the end is inevitable, and they will be saved or condemned regardless of their actions. Those who do not share this belief, who see the crisis as inevitable, but believe either that it can be postponed, or maybe that we are on the cusp of deciding between salvation and damnation, between heaven and hell, feel the opposite need,t he need to act, and act now, lest they delay too long and bring disaster.

This is the attitude I mentioned earlier, the one often exploited by those who induce others to believe in a crisis. When someone is convinced the situation is dire, with disaster about to come about, it is easy to persuade him that he must make a decision now, must change at once, without time for reflection, for considering alternatives, as failing to act will do nothing but ensure his doom. It is a mindset which, sadly, we see all too often in politics, even in situations which seem less than critical. For example, as I described in "The Runaway Stagecoach", this false dichotomy -- choose a specific change or keep the present system forever -- is used as a way of "hard selling" the FairTax, proposing that the current tax system is so defective that we must choose now to either embrace the FairTax, or suffer disaster. No mention is made of any other alternatives, no discussion of possible reforms, of the costs of change, or the possible negatives of making a change. It is sold as a crisis to force us to decide between only two alternatives, and choose immediately.

This probably does not need to be dwelt on much more, but let us give it a little more thought, just to be sure we fully understand the implications. When one is convinced there is a disaster looming, and that inactivity will ensure that disaster's arrival, so long as one imagines there is any way out -- as any other belief will lead only to apathy and inactivity -- one is likely to jump at any proposal, without thought as to costs, consequences or alternatives. As one already expects the worse, there simply is nothing to be gained by performing normal cost-benefit analysis. No choice is going to be worse than the alternative, even if it solves nothing, while taking up time and money, since the disaster is all encompassing, the end result is still the same. So, as long as one believes the end is close enough that delay is the only risk, and that another solution is unlikely to be presented¹⁰, then it makes sense to jump at any proposal.Of course, if the belief in disaster is mistaken, then it is objectively incorrect¹¹, but obviously those jumping at such solutions believe the disaster to be very real.

This fear of delay has an additional consequence, especially in all things political. It tends to heighten emotions, making issues that would otherwise be handled by relatively dispassionate debate, become triggers of angry arguments. And it is easy to see why. Those convinced of the coming disaster fear nothing more than delay, which they see as the only sure way to bring about doom. And so, when anyone proposes waiting, additional consideration, investigating alternatives and the like, those worried about delay see them as part of the problem, as people actively fighting to bring disaster, and tend to react with a good deal of hostility. And so, what would normally be a staid, even boring, topic of political debate can often explode into vehement fighting, even among those nominally on the same side, as those fearing disaster do all they can to ensure it is delayed or stopped.

Having covered most of the prominent political consequences, perhaps we should ask about economics. We did mention some economic aspects, in the foreshortening of time horizons, as well as the tendency toward either frenetic activity or apathy, though at the time they were treated more as political than economic concepts. However, seen from the economic perspective, those cover pretty well the fundamental economic aspects.

Given a belief in a coming end, people will obviously be disinclined to plan past that point, and this most will be reluctant to undertake any activity which will bear substantial returns far into the future. In other words, individual investments will tend to favor short term gains, the cost of long term capital will rise and individuals will undertake personal investments and improvements in their firms only if they expect to recoup the losses in the shorter term. In addition, they are more likely to exploit assets to maximize short term returns, rather than plan to make them last longer. (Eg. Showing little concern for wear on equipment or putting aside money for replacing physical plant.) Of course, most do not adopt belief in disasters with a definite time horizon, so they do not know when they will no longer need their worldly goods. And so they do not cut off all longer term investments, or end all preparation for the future. Instead, they simply act as if they expect very poor future returns, allowing the uncertainty of whether there will or will not be a future to color their planning. This will still tend to skew them toward immediate results and short term returns in favor of long term ones, but just not to the same degree as those who believe in an apocalypse with a known future date.

Other than that tendency to favor immediate returns, as well as the mix of frenetic activity and apathy, the only likely economic consequence is the usual constellation of consequences that come about whenever the future becomes less certain. Granted, one would think with looming disaster¹² expected the future would be more certain, and so it is, but so long as the date is unknown, the future is, from an economic perspective, uncertain. We know that at some point all of our current economic plans and activities will become irrelevant, and so we must hope to produce the maximum returns possible up to the point, but we do not know when that point is, and that uncertainty, coupled with the all encompassing nature of the event, makes the total uncertainty of the future much greater.
And so, as with any increase in uncertainty, the cost of investment will rise, higher costs of capital will decrease investment, and in general, things will both slow down and experience less efficient allocations of resources¹³.

The social consequences are less obvious, and mostly covered by our earlier talks about the changes in morality, as well as the combination of frenzied, poorly directed activity, as well as apathy. Clearly there are other ways one can respond to the belief that one is facing impending doom (or is awaiting certain salvation), but by far these reactions are the most common.

Which brings me to the conclusion of this work. As I said in earlier essays, the belief that we are living in unique times, that we are facing either destruction or salvation, that, in either case, history is, in some sense, about to end, brings about considerable changes in the ways we conduct our lives. Politically, we tend to suffer from poor judgment, failing to properly evaluate our choices, as well as basing choices upon the expectation of outside forces resolving our problems for us. Economically, it tends to deter long range planning, causing a general decrease in efficiency and growth. And socially it tends to favor a mix of frantic action and lethargy, as well as a tendency toward licentiousness, as the concept of future consequences loses its significance. Of course, different individuals respond in unique ways, and circumstances may change the overall reaction, but, in general, the expectation of dramatic changes in the near future tends to have quite disastrous consequences for the state, the economy and society as a whole.

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1. I am sure some will argue that certain fears are justified. For example, the worries brought about by the invention of the nuclear bomb. However, we have to recall, similar predictions of the end of civilization accompanied the introduction of many previous weapons, from poison gas to gunpowder weapons to crossbows. So, while nuclear weapons represent a change in the way we fight, and in our destructive capacity, whether we choose to see them as just one more change, or the sign of impending doom, says more about us than about the weapons themselves.

2. It is interesting that many, right and left, take our loss of moral standards as a sign of the coming end, yet the same basic beliefs underlie both that moral decline and the tendency to imagine that the end is coming. As we discussed, the belief in our own novelty, on the excessive significance we place upon the times in which we happen to live are the reason we imagine those times must be significant, must mark a turning point. And that is but a variation upon the same love of novelty which justifies the collapse of morality which serves for many as a sign of that collapse.

3. Of course salesmen don't claim the world is coming to an end, they simply draw the potential customer's attention to the unpredictability of death or disaster, mention how good it is to make plans to prevent disaster from bankrupting one's loved ones, and then allow the slowly growing fears to inspire the customer to buy the insurance, or whatever they are offering. Not that everyone selling insurance and the like does this, but there certainly are some. (And I say this as someone who, many years ago in his early 20's, sold cemetery lots for one of Baltimore's largest cemeteries. That was one that had so far been left off my CV on this blog. For the more illustrious part of my work history, I suggest "Fear Driven Enterprises", for at least a partial work history, if anyone is interested. My more relevant intellectual history can be found in "The Right Identity", among other places.)

4. I will grant that the doomsday version of protectionism is not as popular today as it once was. We have not seen the like of the 1980's fears of impending Japanese buyout of the US. (For those too young to recall, rent some low budget science fiction from the mid to late 80's and examine how often the "future" included Japanese companies ruling over US cities. Or buy one of the many sci fi themed role playing games from the same era -- Cyberpunk and Shadowrun both come to mind -- and examine how often it is simply assumed that the US would be partly or wholly owned by Japanese firms.) However, we have seen some hints of a revival of those fears in the worries over the Chinese purchase of US debt, which I discussed in "Really Silly Fears", "Dismissing Conspiracy Theories" and "Our New Paranoia". For those who really imagine trade is some sort of war, and protectionism is a good idea, I would suggest reading  "Smaller Government , Fair Weather Friends and Special Cases", "Cheap Lighters, Overseas Dumping and Monopolies", "Jobs, Jobs, Jobs, and More Jobs", "Protectionism", "Protectionism Right and Left", "Fear of Trade",  "The Inevitable Corruption of Protectionism" and "Simple Evidence".

5. I have some difficulty calling those who were self-described punk rockers in the 90's or 2000's by that name. As a punk rocker of the early to mid 80's, I was largely influenced by the original punk rock attitude which, for better or worse, was largely simple hooliganism. We may have espoused anarchy, but we weren't exactly serious. We we apolitical to an extreme. Bands mocked politicians, but those of all political stripes. We had no agenda, other than drinking, causing trouble and... well causing more trouble. There were even then "socially conscious" bands espousing left wing causes, but most old timers had little interest in them. By the 90's though, it had become almost impossible to distinguish supposed punk rockers from the run of the mill left wing college "alternative music" crowd, and so I find it confusing to label them with the same term I used to describe my apolitical companions of a decade earlier. But, if we can survive the many meanings of liberal, I suppose I can handle the multiple meanings of punk, and will use the term, but with a few caveats.

6. It is interesting that the Zero Population Growth movement arose at the same time as the activism and nihilism of the late 60's came to full flower. Granted, it was largely driven by the environmental beliefs of the day, but to a degree its success was aided by the belief that children were no longer important, as they were unlikely to inherit the world, or if they did it would not be one worth inheriting. If children were still valued tot he degree they once had been, ZPG, regardless of the strength of the environmental movement, would have remained nothing but a footnote, rather than becoming, for a time, a viable, if small, political movement, and one which reappears to this day.

7. What is interesting is how this ties into footnote #2. The same mindset creates both amorality and a belief in impending disaster, and that belief in disaster brings about an increase in amorality. Is it any wonder that, once the romantic mindset begins to spread within a culture, the decline of standards is a terribly rapid, and accelerating, process. ("In Defense of Standards", "Deadly Cynicism", "Juvenile Intellectuals", "Pushing the Envelope", "I Blame the Romantics", "The Adoration of Youth", "The Fascination with Change")

8. Again, it is interesting that the juvenile mindset favors the belief in impending disaster, yet that belief causes us to favor the short term over the long, which is itself a juvenile trait. In this way, as with several other traits, the attitude behind these actions tend to become self-reinforcing, with shortsighted juveniles supporting the expectation of disaster, which itself favors short-sighted thinking which is favorable to juvenile attitudes.

9. While seemingly in contrast to the activism I portray as politically juvenile, this actually fits with it quite well. As anyone who was a teen, or spent time with teens, knows, they often move back and forth between manic energy and utter apathy, often because they place too much emphasis on everything. By seeing every happening as of the utmost importance, they tend to approach each new thing with an excess of energy, but also take each setback as a crushing blow, leading them to this see-swing between highs and lows. In many ways, the manner in which our culture responds to belief that we live in unique times reproduces this mental process.

10. If one believes another solution may be presented, or enough time exists for trying multiple solutions, then there is a need for cost-benefit analysis, as trying one alternative may prevent attempts to try alternatives. This is why those exploiting this fear try to convince others the disaster is almost upon them.

11. I say "objectively wrong", not in the sense I criticize in "The Right Way" and elsewhere, but meaning that, were the actor to come to realize the disaster was not coming, he would believe he had acted incorrectly by not considering the costs and benefits of his decision.

12. I say "disaster", but those expecting salvation produce results little different.

13. it does not matter that the belief in disasters is not universal. So long as some believe, they will act on that belief and change the market to a degree, to which the rest of the market will react. Obviously, the belief will have a smaller impact if there are fewer who believe, but it will still have an impact.

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POSTSCRIPT

I have only recently been able to write any substantial amount, as work has finally allowed me a little free time, and in that time I have decided that, in addition to finishing "Liberalism, Its Origins and Consequences" and writing a comprehensive examination of bureaucracy, to replace the many essays ("The Bureaucratic Mind", "Bureaucratic Management", "The Inevitability of Bureaucratic Management in Government Enterprises", "Organizations as Filters", "Bureaucracy and Arbitrary Power", "Somewhat Off-Topic Rants", "Bureaucracy Revisited", "How the Government Corrupts Relationships", "Bureaucratic Management and Self-Policing", "Inflexibility and Bureaucracy", "In The Most Favorable Light", "With Good Intentions", "Grow or Die, The Inevitable Expansion of Everything", "Fear Driven Enterprises", "Adaptability and Government", "The Wrong Solution to Bureaucracy") currently cited whenever the topic arises, I would also like to repeat my experiment in "Liberalism, Its Origins and Consequences", examining this time the subject of how Romanticism, and the worship of both youth and novelty, has changed our society. As part of that essay, I will obviously revisit the topic of this essay, though likely in less detail than I did here. Still, it seemed a good idea to look at this subject again, before beginning the larger series of essays, if only to get a feel for the material once again.

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UPDATE(2011/11/10): Somehow, when writing this, I managed to completely forget my post "Self-Interest Versus Narcissism", which discusses almost identical ideas, making many similar arguments. I suppose the title, being less obvious than "All Life in a Day, or, How Our Mistaken View of History Distorts Our Understanding of Events", allowed me to overlook it.